A Closer Look at GAN Priors: Exploiting Intermediate Features for Enhanced Model Inversion Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Qiu, Yixiang, Fang, Hao, Yu, Hongyao, Chen, Bin, Qiu, MeiKang, Xia, Shu-Tao
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Qiu, Yixiang
Fang, Hao
Yu, Hongyao
Chen, Bin
Qiu, MeiKang
Xia, Shu-Tao
author_facet Qiu, Yixiang
Fang, Hao
Yu, Hongyao
Chen, Bin
Qiu, MeiKang
Xia, Shu-Tao
contents Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct privacy-sensitive training data from released models by utilizing output information, raising extensive concerns about the security of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Recent advances in generative adversarial networks (GANs) have contributed significantly to the improved performance of MI attacks due to their powerful ability to generate realistic images with high fidelity and appropriate semantics. However, previous MI attacks have solely disclosed private information in the latent space of GAN priors, limiting their semantic extraction and transferability across multiple target models and datasets. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method, Intermediate Features enhanced Generative Model Inversion (IF-GMI), which disassembles the GAN structure and exploits features between intermediate blocks. This allows us to extend the optimization space from latent code to intermediate features with enhanced expressive capabilities. To prevent GAN priors from generating unrealistic images, we apply a L1 ball constraint to the optimization process. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous approaches and achieves state-of-the-art results under various settings, especially in the out-of-distribution (OOD) scenario. Our code is available at: https://github.com/final-solution/IF-GMI
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_13863
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Closer Look at GAN Priors: Exploiting Intermediate Features for Enhanced Model Inversion Attacks
Qiu, Yixiang
Fang, Hao
Yu, Hongyao
Chen, Bin
Qiu, MeiKang
Xia, Shu-Tao
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct privacy-sensitive training data from released models by utilizing output information, raising extensive concerns about the security of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Recent advances in generative adversarial networks (GANs) have contributed significantly to the improved performance of MI attacks due to their powerful ability to generate realistic images with high fidelity and appropriate semantics. However, previous MI attacks have solely disclosed private information in the latent space of GAN priors, limiting their semantic extraction and transferability across multiple target models and datasets. To address this challenge, we propose a novel method, Intermediate Features enhanced Generative Model Inversion (IF-GMI), which disassembles the GAN structure and exploits features between intermediate blocks. This allows us to extend the optimization space from latent code to intermediate features with enhanced expressive capabilities. To prevent GAN priors from generating unrealistic images, we apply a L1 ball constraint to the optimization process. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous approaches and achieves state-of-the-art results under various settings, especially in the out-of-distribution (OOD) scenario. Our code is available at: https://github.com/final-solution/IF-GMI
title A Closer Look at GAN Priors: Exploiting Intermediate Features for Enhanced Model Inversion Attacks
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13863