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Main Author: Allmis, Patrick
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14045
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author Allmis, Patrick
author_facet Allmis, Patrick
contents Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_14045
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance
Allmis, Patrick
Theoretical Economics
Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.
title Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14045