Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917727860424704 |
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| author | Feng, Di Coreno, Jacob |
| author_facet | Feng, Di Coreno, Jacob |
| contents | We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_14101 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms Feng, Di Coreno, Jacob Theoretical Economics We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties (strategy-proofness and non-bossiness), our two new properties identify serial dictatorships and sequential dictatorships, respectively. |
| title | Justified Fairness in House Allocation Problems: two Characterizations of Strategy-proof Mechanisms |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14101 |