Similarity of Information and Collective Action
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914459490975744 |
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| author | Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya |
| author_facet | Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya |
| contents | We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_14773 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Similarity of Information and Collective Action Basak, Deepal Deb, Joyee Kuvalekar, Aditya General Economics Economics We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight. |
| title | Similarity of Information and Collective Action |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.14773 |