Agora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866908588022169600 |
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| author | Chen, Hongbo Zhou, Quan Yang, Sen Han, Xing Zhang, Fan Zhang, Danfeng Wang, Xiaofeng |
| author_facet | Chen, Hongbo Zhou, Quan Yang, Sen Han, Xing Zhang, Fan Zhang, Danfeng Wang, Xiaofeng |
| contents | Binary verification plays a pivotal role in software security, yet building a verification service that is both open and trustworthy poses a formidable challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel binary verification service, AGORA, scrupulously designed to overcome the challenge. At the heart of this approach lies a strategic insight: certain tasks can be delegated to untrusted entities, while the corresponding validators are securely housed within the trusted computing base (TCB). AGORA can validate untrusted assertions generated for versatile policies. Through a novel blockchain-based bounty task manager, it also utilizes crowdsourcing to remove trust in theorem provers. These synergistic techniques successfully ameliorate the TCB size burden associated with two procedures: binary analysis and theorem proving. The design of AGORA allows untrusted parties to participate in these complex processes. Moreover, based on running the optimized TCB within trusted execution environments and recording the verification process on a blockchain, the public can audit the correctness of verification results. By implementing verification workflows for software-based fault isolation policy and side-channel mitigation, our evaluation demonstrates the efficacy of AGORA. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_15062 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Agora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing Chen, Hongbo Zhou, Quan Yang, Sen Han, Xing Zhang, Fan Zhang, Danfeng Wang, Xiaofeng Cryptography and Security Binary verification plays a pivotal role in software security, yet building a verification service that is both open and trustworthy poses a formidable challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel binary verification service, AGORA, scrupulously designed to overcome the challenge. At the heart of this approach lies a strategic insight: certain tasks can be delegated to untrusted entities, while the corresponding validators are securely housed within the trusted computing base (TCB). AGORA can validate untrusted assertions generated for versatile policies. Through a novel blockchain-based bounty task manager, it also utilizes crowdsourcing to remove trust in theorem provers. These synergistic techniques successfully ameliorate the TCB size burden associated with two procedures: binary analysis and theorem proving. The design of AGORA allows untrusted parties to participate in these complex processes. Moreover, based on running the optimized TCB within trusted execution environments and recording the verification process on a blockchain, the public can audit the correctness of verification results. By implementing verification workflows for software-based fault isolation policy and side-channel mitigation, our evaluation demonstrates the efficacy of AGORA. |
| title | Agora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.15062 |