A Learning-Based Attack Framework to Break SOTA Poisoning Defenses in Federated Learning
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866913444562731008 |
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| author | Yang, Yuxin Li, Qiang Nie, Chenfei Hong, Yuan Pang, Meng Wang, Binghui |
| author_facet | Yang, Yuxin Li, Qiang Nie, Chenfei Hong, Yuan Pang, Meng Wang, Binghui |
| contents | Federated Learning (FL) is a novel client-server distributed learning framework that can protect data privacy. However, recent works show that FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Many defenses with robust aggregators (AGRs) are proposed to mitigate the issue, but they are all broken by advanced attacks. Very recently, some renewed robust AGRs are designed, typically with novel clipping or/and filtering strate-gies, and they show promising defense performance against the advanced poisoning attacks. In this paper, we show that these novel robust AGRs are also vulnerable to carefully designed poisoning attacks. Specifically, we observe that breaking these robust AGRs reduces to bypassing the clipping or/and filtering of malicious clients, and propose an optimization-based attack framework to leverage this observation. Under the framework, we then design the customized attack against each robust AGR. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and threat models verify our proposed optimization-based attack can break the SOTA AGRs. We hence call for novel defenses against poisoning attacks to FL. Code is available at: https://github.com/Yuxin104/ BreakSTOAPoisoningDefenses. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_15267 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Learning-Based Attack Framework to Break SOTA Poisoning Defenses in Federated Learning Yang, Yuxin Li, Qiang Nie, Chenfei Hong, Yuan Pang, Meng Wang, Binghui Cryptography and Security Federated Learning (FL) is a novel client-server distributed learning framework that can protect data privacy. However, recent works show that FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Many defenses with robust aggregators (AGRs) are proposed to mitigate the issue, but they are all broken by advanced attacks. Very recently, some renewed robust AGRs are designed, typically with novel clipping or/and filtering strate-gies, and they show promising defense performance against the advanced poisoning attacks. In this paper, we show that these novel robust AGRs are also vulnerable to carefully designed poisoning attacks. Specifically, we observe that breaking these robust AGRs reduces to bypassing the clipping or/and filtering of malicious clients, and propose an optimization-based attack framework to leverage this observation. Under the framework, we then design the customized attack against each robust AGR. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and threat models verify our proposed optimization-based attack can break the SOTA AGRs. We hence call for novel defenses against poisoning attacks to FL. Code is available at: https://github.com/Yuxin104/ BreakSTOAPoisoningDefenses. |
| title | A Learning-Based Attack Framework to Break SOTA Poisoning Defenses in Federated Learning |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.15267 |