Diversity in Choice as Majorization
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914045091643392 |
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| author | Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin |
| author_facet | Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin |
| contents | We propose a framework that uses majorization to model diversity and representativeness in school admissions. We generalize the standard notion of majorization to accommodate arbitrary distributional targets, such as a student body that reflects the population served by the school. Building on this framework, we introduce and axiomatically characterize the $r$-targeting Schur choice rule, which balances diversity and priority in admissions. We show that this rule is optimal: any alternative rule must either leave seats unfilled, reduce diversity, or admit lower-priority students. The rule satisfies path independence (and substitutability), which guarantees desirable outcomes in matching markets. Our work contributes to the ongoing discourse on market design by providing a new and flexible framework for improving diversity and representation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_17589 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Diversity in Choice as Majorization Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin Theoretical Economics We propose a framework that uses majorization to model diversity and representativeness in school admissions. We generalize the standard notion of majorization to accommodate arbitrary distributional targets, such as a student body that reflects the population served by the school. Building on this framework, we introduce and axiomatically characterize the $r$-targeting Schur choice rule, which balances diversity and priority in admissions. We show that this rule is optimal: any alternative rule must either leave seats unfilled, reduce diversity, or admit lower-priority students. The rule satisfies path independence (and substitutability), which guarantees desirable outcomes in matching markets. Our work contributes to the ongoing discourse on market design by providing a new and flexible framework for improving diversity and representation. |
| title | Diversity in Choice as Majorization |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.17589 |