Stackelberg games with the third party

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Jiang, Yiming, Wei, Yawei, Xue, Jie
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Jiang, Yiming
Wei, Yawei
Xue, Jie
author_facet Jiang, Yiming
Wei, Yawei
Xue, Jie
contents In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all followers are experiencing learning-by-doing. The role of a third party is similar to industry associations, they supervise the leader's implementation and impose penalties for the defection with the discount factor. Then we obtain different forms of discount factors in different models and effective conditions to prevent defection.These results are consistent and the third party intervention is effective and maneuverable in practice.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_18401
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Stackelberg games with the third party
Jiang, Yiming
Wei, Yawei
Xue, Jie
Optimization and Control
In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all followers are experiencing learning-by-doing. The role of a third party is similar to industry associations, they supervise the leader's implementation and impose penalties for the defection with the discount factor. Then we obtain different forms of discount factors in different models and effective conditions to prevent defection.These results are consistent and the third party intervention is effective and maneuverable in practice.
title Stackelberg games with the third party
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18401