Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.19147 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866909270429138944 |
|---|---|
| author | Wei, Chun-Yan Cai, Xiao-Qiu Wang, Tian-Yin |
| author_facet | Wei, Chun-Yan Cai, Xiao-Qiu Wang, Tian-Yin |
| contents | Quantum private query (QPQ) is the quantum version for symmetrically private retrieval. However, the user privacy in QPQ is generally guarded in the non-realtime and cheat sensitive way. That is, the dishonest database holder's cheating to elicit user privacy can only be discovered after the protocol is finished (when the user finds some errors in the retrieved database item). Such delayed detection may cause very unpleasant results for the user in real-life applications. Current efforts to protect user privacy in realtime in existing QPQ protocols mainly use two techniques, i.e., adding an honesty checking on the database or allowing the user to reorder the qubits. We reexamine these two kinds of QPQ protocols and find neither of them can work well. We give concrete cheating strategies for both participants and show that honesty checking of inner participant should be dealt more carefully in for example the choosing of checking qubits. We hope such discussion can supply new concerns when detection of dishonest participant is considered in quantum multi-party secure computations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_19147 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reexamination of the realtime protection for user privacy in practical quantum private query Wei, Chun-Yan Cai, Xiao-Qiu Wang, Tian-Yin Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security Quantum private query (QPQ) is the quantum version for symmetrically private retrieval. However, the user privacy in QPQ is generally guarded in the non-realtime and cheat sensitive way. That is, the dishonest database holder's cheating to elicit user privacy can only be discovered after the protocol is finished (when the user finds some errors in the retrieved database item). Such delayed detection may cause very unpleasant results for the user in real-life applications. Current efforts to protect user privacy in realtime in existing QPQ protocols mainly use two techniques, i.e., adding an honesty checking on the database or allowing the user to reorder the qubits. We reexamine these two kinds of QPQ protocols and find neither of them can work well. We give concrete cheating strategies for both participants and show that honesty checking of inner participant should be dealt more carefully in for example the choosing of checking qubits. We hope such discussion can supply new concerns when detection of dishonest participant is considered in quantum multi-party secure computations. |
| title | Reexamination of the realtime protection for user privacy in practical quantum private query |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.19147 |