Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917736114814976 |
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| author | Aziz, Hariz Kagita, Venkateswara Rao Rastegari, Baharak Suzuki, Mashbat |
| author_facet | Aziz, Hariz Kagita, Venkateswara Rao Rastegari, Baharak Suzuki, Mashbat |
| contents | We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain approval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as computing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as justified representation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_19391 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty Aziz, Hariz Kagita, Venkateswara Rao Rastegari, Baharak Suzuki, Mashbat Computer Science and Game Theory We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain approval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as computing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as justified representation. |
| title | Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.19391 |