A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866917736214429696 |
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| author | Wang, Chenlan Moharrami, Mehrdad Liu, Mingyan |
| author_facet | Wang, Chenlan Moharrami, Mehrdad Liu, Mingyan |
| contents | We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in arriving too early as well as a risk in traveling alone. This gives rise to the possibility of the agents cooperating by traveling together while competing for the reward. In our prior work [1] we studied this problem as a sequential game among a set of $N$ competing agents in continuous time, and defined the formation of a group traveling together as arriving at exactly the same time. In the present study, we relax this definition to allow arrival times within a small window, and study a 2-agent game in both continuous and discrete time, referred to as the flock formation game. We derive and examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_19678 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking Wang, Chenlan Moharrami, Mehrdad Liu, Mingyan Computer Science and Game Theory We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in arriving too early as well as a risk in traveling alone. This gives rise to the possibility of the agents cooperating by traveling together while competing for the reward. In our prior work [1] we studied this problem as a sequential game among a set of $N$ competing agents in continuous time, and defined the formation of a group traveling together as arriving at exactly the same time. In the present study, we relax this definition to allow arrival times within a small window, and study a 2-agent game in both continuous and discrete time, referred to as the flock formation game. We derive and examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game. |
| title | A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.19678 |