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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Yu, Feiyang
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21143
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author Yu, Feiyang
author_facet Yu, Feiyang
contents We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite more people to the auction. We prove that our mechanism is individual rational, and incentivize compatible with regard to the buyers' action. Furthermore, we show the approximation ratio of our mechanism to the optimal fixed-price auction in two ways, theoretically and via Monte-Carlo simulation, and show a high practical ratio. Finally, we discuss several factors affecting the behavior of our mechanism and its feasibility in reality.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_21143
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Diffusion Mechanism Design in Tree-Structured Social Network
Yu, Feiyang
Computer Science and Game Theory
We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite more people to the auction. We prove that our mechanism is individual rational, and incentivize compatible with regard to the buyers' action. Furthermore, we show the approximation ratio of our mechanism to the optimal fixed-price auction in two ways, theoretically and via Monte-Carlo simulation, and show a high practical ratio. Finally, we discuss several factors affecting the behavior of our mechanism and its feasibility in reality.
title Diffusion Mechanism Design in Tree-Structured Social Network
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21143