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Lattice operations for the pairwise stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bonifacio, Agustin G., Juarez, Noelia, Manasero, Paola B.
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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