DeepBaR: Fault Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Network Layers
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866917738027417600 |
|---|---|
| author | Martínez-Mejía, C. A. Solano, J. Breier, J. Bucko, D. Hou, X. |
| author_facet | Martínez-Mejía, C. A. Solano, J. Breier, J. Bucko, D. Hou, X. |
| contents | Machine Learning using neural networks has received prominent attention recently because of its success in solving a wide variety of computational tasks, in particular in the field of computer vision. However, several works have drawn attention to potential security risks involved with the training and implementation of such networks. In this work, we introduce DeepBaR, a novel approach that implants backdoors on neural networks by faulting their behavior at training, especially during fine-tuning. Our technique aims to generate adversarial samples by optimizing a custom loss function that mimics the implanted backdoors while adding an almost non-visible trigger in the image. We attack three popular convolutional neural network architectures and show that DeepBaR attacks have a success rate of up to 98.30\%. Furthermore, DeepBaR does not significantly affect the accuracy of the attacked networks after deployment when non-malicious inputs are given. Remarkably, DeepBaR allows attackers to choose an input that looks similar to a given class, from a human perspective, but that will be classified as belonging to an arbitrary target class. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_21220 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | DeepBaR: Fault Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Network Layers Martínez-Mejía, C. A. Solano, J. Breier, J. Bucko, D. Hou, X. Machine Learning Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Machine Learning using neural networks has received prominent attention recently because of its success in solving a wide variety of computational tasks, in particular in the field of computer vision. However, several works have drawn attention to potential security risks involved with the training and implementation of such networks. In this work, we introduce DeepBaR, a novel approach that implants backdoors on neural networks by faulting their behavior at training, especially during fine-tuning. Our technique aims to generate adversarial samples by optimizing a custom loss function that mimics the implanted backdoors while adding an almost non-visible trigger in the image. We attack three popular convolutional neural network architectures and show that DeepBaR attacks have a success rate of up to 98.30\%. Furthermore, DeepBaR does not significantly affect the accuracy of the attacked networks after deployment when non-malicious inputs are given. Remarkably, DeepBaR allows attackers to choose an input that looks similar to a given class, from a human perspective, but that will be classified as belonging to an arbitrary target class. |
| title | DeepBaR: Fault Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Network Layers |
| topic | Machine Learning Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21220 |