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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21785 |
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| _version_ | 1866917738217209856 |
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| author | Durvasula, Naveen Roughgarden, Tim |
| author_facet | Durvasula, Naveen Roughgarden, Tim |
| contents | We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10\%, then a sudden loss of .1\% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1\% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks.
Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_21785 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Restaking Networks Durvasula, Naveen Roughgarden, Tim Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms We study the risks of validator reuse across multiple services in a restaking protocol. We characterize the robust security of a restaking network as a function of the buffer between the costs and profits from attacks. For example, our results imply that if attack costs always exceed attack profits by 10\%, then a sudden loss of .1\% of the overall stake (e.g., due to a software error) cannot result in the ultimate loss of more than 1.1\% of the overall stake. We also provide local analogs of these overcollateralization conditions and robust security guarantees that apply specifically for a target service or coalition of services. All of our bounds on worst-case stake loss are the best possible. Finally, we bound the maximum-possible length of a cascade of attacks. Our results suggest measures of robustness that could be exposed to the participants in a restaking protocol. We also suggest polynomial-time computable sufficient conditions that can proxy for these measures. |
| title | Robust Restaking Networks |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21785 |