How much should you pay for restaking security?
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914897516822528 |
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| author | Chitra, Tarun Pai, Mallesh |
| author_facet | Chitra, Tarun Pai, Mallesh |
| contents | Restaking protocols have aggregated billions of dollars of security by utilizing token incentives and payments. A natural question to ask is: How much security do restaked services \emph{really} need to purchase? To answer this question, we expand a model of Durvasula and Roughgarden [DR24] that includes incentives and an expanded threat model consisting of strategic attackers and users. Our model shows that an adversary with a strictly submodular profit combined with strategic node operators who respond to incentives can avoid the large-scale cascading failures of~[DR24]. We utilize our model to construct an approximation algorithm for choosing token-based incentives that achieve a given security level against adversaries who are bounded in the number of services they can simultaneously attack. Our results suggest that incentivized restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_00928 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How much should you pay for restaking security? Chitra, Tarun Pai, Mallesh Computer Science and Game Theory Risk Management Restaking protocols have aggregated billions of dollars of security by utilizing token incentives and payments. A natural question to ask is: How much security do restaked services \emph{really} need to purchase? To answer this question, we expand a model of Durvasula and Roughgarden [DR24] that includes incentives and an expanded threat model consisting of strategic attackers and users. Our model shows that an adversary with a strictly submodular profit combined with strategic node operators who respond to incentives can avoid the large-scale cascading failures of~[DR24]. We utilize our model to construct an approximation algorithm for choosing token-based incentives that achieve a given security level against adversaries who are bounded in the number of services they can simultaneously attack. Our results suggest that incentivized restaking protocols can be secure with proper incentive management. |
| title | How much should you pay for restaking security? |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Risk Management |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.00928 |