Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866917383188250624 |
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| author | Dall'Ara, Pietro |
| author_facet | Dall'Ara, Pietro |
| contents | This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. Persuasion has two margins: an extensive (effort) and an intensive (action). The receiver's utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish an equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al.~(2017). In applications, the sender's optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_01250 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver Dall'Ara, Pietro Theoretical Economics This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. Persuasion has two margins: an extensive (effort) and an intensive (action). The receiver's utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish an equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al.~(2017). In applications, the sender's optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states. |
| title | Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.01250 |