On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Boerstler, Kyle Keswani, Vijay Chan, Lok Borg, Jana Schaich Conitzer, Vincent Heidari, Hoda Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter |
| author_facet | Boerstler, Kyle Keswani, Vijay Chan, Lok Borg, Jana Schaich Conitzer, Vincent Heidari, Hoda Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter |
| contents | Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants' responses are stable over time such that, all other relevant factors being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants' true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don't track. If participants' moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants' true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios was around 10-18% across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of moral preference elicitation, highlighting the role of response instability in causing value misalignment between stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_02862 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods Boerstler, Kyle Keswani, Vijay Chan, Lok Borg, Jana Schaich Conitzer, Vincent Heidari, Hoda Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence Human-Computer Interaction Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants' responses are stable over time such that, all other relevant factors being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants' true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don't track. If participants' moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants' true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios was around 10-18% across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of moral preference elicitation, highlighting the role of response instability in causing value misalignment between stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments. |
| title | On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods |
| topic | Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence Human-Computer Interaction |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.02862 |