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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03704 |
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| _version_ | 1866914903807229952 |
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| author | Song, Baogang Zhao, Dongdong Yan, Jiang Li, Huanhuan Jiang, Hao |
| author_facet | Song, Baogang Zhao, Dongdong Yan, Jiang Li, Huanhuan Jiang, Hao |
| contents | With the wide application of biometrics, more and more attention has been paid to the security of biometric templates. However most of existing biometric template protection (BTP) methods have some security problems, e.g. the problem that protected templates leak part of the original biometric data (exists in Cancelable Biometrics (CB)), the use of error-correcting codes (ECC) leads to decodable attack, statistical attack (exists in Biometric Cryptosystems (BCS)), the inability to achieve revocability (exists in methods using Neural Network (NN) to learn pre-defined templates), the inability to use cryptographic hash to guarantee strong security (exists in CB and methods using NN to learn latent templates). In this paper, we propose a framework called BioDeepHash based on deep hashing and cryptographic hashing to address the above four problems, where different biometric data of the same user are mapped to a stable code using deep hashing instead of predefined binary codes thus avoiding the use of ECC. An application-specific binary string is employed to achieve revocability. Then cryptographic hashing is used to get the final protected template to ensure strong security. Ultimately our framework achieves not storing any data that would leak part of the original biometric data. We also conduct extensive experiments on facial and iris datasets. Our method achieves an improvement of 10.12$\%$ on the average Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) for iris data and 3.12$\%$ for facial data compared to existing methods. In addition, BioDeepHash achieves extremely low False Acceptance Rate (FAR), i.e. 0$\%$ FAR on the iris dataset and the highest FAR on the facial dataset is only 0.0002$\%$. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_03704 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | BioDeepHash: Mapping Biometrics into a Stable Code Song, Baogang Zhao, Dongdong Yan, Jiang Li, Huanhuan Jiang, Hao Cryptography and Security With the wide application of biometrics, more and more attention has been paid to the security of biometric templates. However most of existing biometric template protection (BTP) methods have some security problems, e.g. the problem that protected templates leak part of the original biometric data (exists in Cancelable Biometrics (CB)), the use of error-correcting codes (ECC) leads to decodable attack, statistical attack (exists in Biometric Cryptosystems (BCS)), the inability to achieve revocability (exists in methods using Neural Network (NN) to learn pre-defined templates), the inability to use cryptographic hash to guarantee strong security (exists in CB and methods using NN to learn latent templates). In this paper, we propose a framework called BioDeepHash based on deep hashing and cryptographic hashing to address the above four problems, where different biometric data of the same user are mapped to a stable code using deep hashing instead of predefined binary codes thus avoiding the use of ECC. An application-specific binary string is employed to achieve revocability. Then cryptographic hashing is used to get the final protected template to ensure strong security. Ultimately our framework achieves not storing any data that would leak part of the original biometric data. We also conduct extensive experiments on facial and iris datasets. Our method achieves an improvement of 10.12$\%$ on the average Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) for iris data and 3.12$\%$ for facial data compared to existing methods. In addition, BioDeepHash achieves extremely low False Acceptance Rate (FAR), i.e. 0$\%$ FAR on the iris dataset and the highest FAR on the facial dataset is only 0.0002$\%$. |
| title | BioDeepHash: Mapping Biometrics into a Stable Code |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03704 |