Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914905798475776 |
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| author | Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus |
| author_facet | Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus |
| contents | We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_04509 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements Grigoryan, Aram Möller, Markus Theoretical Economics We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity. |
| title | Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.04509 |