A Generalised $λ$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916353499201536 |
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| author | Chakrabarti, Subhadip Gilles, Robert P Mallozzi, Lina |
| author_facet | Chakrabarti, Subhadip Gilles, Robert P Mallozzi, Lina |
| contents | In this note we develop a generalisation of the $λ$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $λ$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $λ$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_06086 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Generalised $λ$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games Chakrabarti, Subhadip Gilles, Robert P Mallozzi, Lina Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics In this note we develop a generalisation of the $λ$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $λ$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $λ$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games. |
| title | A Generalised $λ$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.06086 |