Dynamic Pricing of Electric Vehicle Charging Station Alliances Under Information Asymmetry

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Liu, Zeyu, Zhou, Yun, Feng, Donghan, Xu, Shaolun, Yi, Yin, Li, Hengjie, Wang, Haojing
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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_version_ 1866929457664622592
author Liu, Zeyu
Zhou, Yun
Feng, Donghan
Xu, Shaolun
Yi, Yin
Li, Hengjie
Wang, Haojing
author_facet Liu, Zeyu
Zhou, Yun
Feng, Donghan
Xu, Shaolun
Yi, Yin
Li, Hengjie
Wang, Haojing
contents Due to the centralization of charging stations (CSs), CSs are organized as charging station alliances (CSAs) in the commercial competition. Under this situation, this paper studies the profit-oriented dynamic pricing strategy of CSAs. As the practicability basis, a privacy-protected bidirectional real-time information interaction framework is designed, under which the status of EVs is utilized as the reference for pricing, and the prices of CSs are the reference for charging decisions. Based on this framework, the decision-making models of EVs and CSs are established, in which the uncertainty caused by the information asymmetry between EVs and CSs and the bounded rationality of EV users are integrated. To solve the pricing decision model, the evolutionary game theory is adopted to describe the dynamic pricing game among CSAs, the equilibrium of which gives the optimal pricing strategy. Finally, the case study results in a real urban area in Shanghai, China verifies the practicability of the framework and the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing strategy.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_06645
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Dynamic Pricing of Electric Vehicle Charging Station Alliances Under Information Asymmetry
Liu, Zeyu
Zhou, Yun
Feng, Donghan
Xu, Shaolun
Yi, Yin
Li, Hengjie
Wang, Haojing
Systems and Control
Due to the centralization of charging stations (CSs), CSs are organized as charging station alliances (CSAs) in the commercial competition. Under this situation, this paper studies the profit-oriented dynamic pricing strategy of CSAs. As the practicability basis, a privacy-protected bidirectional real-time information interaction framework is designed, under which the status of EVs is utilized as the reference for pricing, and the prices of CSs are the reference for charging decisions. Based on this framework, the decision-making models of EVs and CSs are established, in which the uncertainty caused by the information asymmetry between EVs and CSs and the bounded rationality of EV users are integrated. To solve the pricing decision model, the evolutionary game theory is adopted to describe the dynamic pricing game among CSAs, the equilibrium of which gives the optimal pricing strategy. Finally, the case study results in a real urban area in Shanghai, China verifies the practicability of the framework and the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing strategy.
title Dynamic Pricing of Electric Vehicle Charging Station Alliances Under Information Asymmetry
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.06645