Eavesdropping Mobile Apps and Actions through Wireless Traffic in the Open World

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Yang, Xiaoguang, Huang, Yong, Guo, Junli, Zhang, Dalong, Wang, Qingxian
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Yang, Xiaoguang
Huang, Yong
Guo, Junli
Zhang, Dalong
Wang, Qingxian
author_facet Yang, Xiaoguang
Huang, Yong
Guo, Junli
Zhang, Dalong
Wang, Qingxian
contents While smartphones and WiFi networks are bringing many positive changes to people's lives, they are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks, which infer user's private information from encrypted traffic. Existing traffic analysis attacks mainly target TCP/IP layers or are limited to the closed-world assumption, where all possible apps and actions have been involved in the model training. To overcome these limitations, we propose MACPrint, a novel system that infers mobile apps and in-app actions based on WiFi MAC layer traffic in the open-world setting. MACPrint first extracts rich statistical and contextual features of encrypted wireless traffic. Then, we develop Label Recorder, an automatic traffic labeling app, to improve labeling accuracy in the training phase. Finally, TCN models with OpenMax functions are used to recognize mobile apps and actions in the open world accurately. To evaluate our system, we collect MAC layer traffic data over 125 hours from more than 40 apps. The experimental results show that MAC-Print can achieve an accuracy of over 96% for recognizing apps and actions in the closed-world setting, and obtains an accuracy of over 86% in the open-world setting.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_07263
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Eavesdropping Mobile Apps and Actions through Wireless Traffic in the Open World
Yang, Xiaoguang
Huang, Yong
Guo, Junli
Zhang, Dalong
Wang, Qingxian
Cryptography and Security
While smartphones and WiFi networks are bringing many positive changes to people's lives, they are susceptible to traffic analysis attacks, which infer user's private information from encrypted traffic. Existing traffic analysis attacks mainly target TCP/IP layers or are limited to the closed-world assumption, where all possible apps and actions have been involved in the model training. To overcome these limitations, we propose MACPrint, a novel system that infers mobile apps and in-app actions based on WiFi MAC layer traffic in the open-world setting. MACPrint first extracts rich statistical and contextual features of encrypted wireless traffic. Then, we develop Label Recorder, an automatic traffic labeling app, to improve labeling accuracy in the training phase. Finally, TCN models with OpenMax functions are used to recognize mobile apps and actions in the open world accurately. To evaluate our system, we collect MAC layer traffic data over 125 hours from more than 40 apps. The experimental results show that MAC-Print can achieve an accuracy of over 96% for recognizing apps and actions in the closed-world setting, and obtains an accuracy of over 86% in the open-world setting.
title Eavesdropping Mobile Apps and Actions through Wireless Traffic in the Open World
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07263