Protecting Onion Service Users Against Phishing
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916358484131840 |
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| author | Güldenring, Benjamin Roth, Volker |
| author_facet | Güldenring, Benjamin Roth, Volker |
| contents | Phishing websites are a common phenomenon among Tor onion services, and phishers exploit that it is tremendously difficult to distinguish phishing from authentic onion domain names. Operators of onion services devised several strategies to protect their users against phishing. But as we show in this work, none protect users against phishing without producing traces about visited services - something that particularly vulnerable users might want to avoid. In search of a solution we review prior research addressing this problem, and find that only two known approaches, hash visualization and PAKE, are capable of solving this problem.
Hash visualization requires users to recognize large hash values. In order to make hash visualization more practical we design a novel mechanism called recognizer, which substantially reduces the amount of information that users must recognize. We analyze the security and privacy properties of our system formally, and report on our prototype implementation as a browser extension for the Tor web browser. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_07787 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Protecting Onion Service Users Against Phishing Güldenring, Benjamin Roth, Volker Cryptography and Security Human-Computer Interaction D.4.6; K.6.5; E.3; E.4 Phishing websites are a common phenomenon among Tor onion services, and phishers exploit that it is tremendously difficult to distinguish phishing from authentic onion domain names. Operators of onion services devised several strategies to protect their users against phishing. But as we show in this work, none protect users against phishing without producing traces about visited services - something that particularly vulnerable users might want to avoid. In search of a solution we review prior research addressing this problem, and find that only two known approaches, hash visualization and PAKE, are capable of solving this problem. Hash visualization requires users to recognize large hash values. In order to make hash visualization more practical we design a novel mechanism called recognizer, which substantially reduces the amount of information that users must recognize. We analyze the security and privacy properties of our system formally, and report on our prototype implementation as a browser extension for the Tor web browser. |
| title | Protecting Onion Service Users Against Phishing |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Human-Computer Interaction D.4.6; K.6.5; E.3; E.4 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07787 |