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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07821 |
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| _version_ | 1866908854898393088 |
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| author | Miller, Joel Advani, Rishi Kash, Ian Kanich, Chris Zuck, Lenore |
| author_facet | Miller, Joel Advani, Rishi Kash, Ian Kanich, Chris Zuck, Lenore |
| contents | Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed in behavioral economics and other practical settings. We develop an approach for decentralized fair division and compare it with a centralized approach with respect to fairness and social welfare guarantees. Our decentralized model can be seen as a relaxation of previous models of sequential exchange, in light of impossibility results concerning the inability of those models to achieve desirable outcomes. We find that the two models of resource allocation offer contrasting fairness and social welfare guarantees, and map out how these guarantees depend on valuations and other model parameters. We further show conditions under which a mix of the two approaches outperforms either approach in isolation. Despite the simplicity of our decentralized model, we show that under appropriate conditions it can ensure high-quality allocative decisions in an efficient fashion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_07821 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Decentralized Fair Division Miller, Joel Advani, Rishi Kash, Ian Kanich, Chris Zuck, Lenore Computer Science and Game Theory Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed in behavioral economics and other practical settings. We develop an approach for decentralized fair division and compare it with a centralized approach with respect to fairness and social welfare guarantees. Our decentralized model can be seen as a relaxation of previous models of sequential exchange, in light of impossibility results concerning the inability of those models to achieve desirable outcomes. We find that the two models of resource allocation offer contrasting fairness and social welfare guarantees, and map out how these guarantees depend on valuations and other model parameters. We further show conditions under which a mix of the two approaches outperforms either approach in isolation. Despite the simplicity of our decentralized model, we show that under appropriate conditions it can ensure high-quality allocative decisions in an efficient fashion. |
| title | Decentralized Fair Division |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07821 |