Set Values of Dynamic Nonzero Sum Games and Set Valued Hamiltonians

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Qiao, Bixing, Zhang, Jianfeng
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866913470897717248
author Qiao, Bixing
Zhang, Jianfeng
author_facet Qiao, Bixing
Zhang, Jianfeng
contents It is well known that the (unique) value of a stochastic control problem or a two person zero sum game under Isaacs condition can be characterized through a PDE driven by the Hamiltonian. Our goal of this paper is to extend this classical result to nonzero sum games, which typically have multiple Nash equilibria and multiple values. Our object is the set value of the game, which roughly speaking is the set of values over all equilibria and thus is by nature unique. We shall introduce set valued Hamiltonians and characterize the set value of the game through backward SDEs driven by appropriate selectors of the set valued Hamiltonians, where the selectors are typically path dependent. When the set valued Hamiltonian is a singleton, our result covers the standard control problem and two person zero sum game problem under Isaacs condition.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_09047
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Set Values of Dynamic Nonzero Sum Games and Set Valued Hamiltonians
Qiao, Bixing
Zhang, Jianfeng
Optimization and Control
Probability
91A15, 49L12, 60H10
It is well known that the (unique) value of a stochastic control problem or a two person zero sum game under Isaacs condition can be characterized through a PDE driven by the Hamiltonian. Our goal of this paper is to extend this classical result to nonzero sum games, which typically have multiple Nash equilibria and multiple values. Our object is the set value of the game, which roughly speaking is the set of values over all equilibria and thus is by nature unique. We shall introduce set valued Hamiltonians and characterize the set value of the game through backward SDEs driven by appropriate selectors of the set valued Hamiltonians, where the selectors are typically path dependent. When the set valued Hamiltonian is a singleton, our result covers the standard control problem and two person zero sum game problem under Isaacs condition.
title Set Values of Dynamic Nonzero Sum Games and Set Valued Hamiltonians
topic Optimization and Control
Probability
91A15, 49L12, 60H10
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.09047