Global BGP Attacks that Evade Route Monitoring
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916361396027392 |
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| author | Birge-Lee, Henry Apostolaki, Maria Rexford, Jennifer |
| author_facet | Birge-Lee, Henry Apostolaki, Maria Rexford, Jennifer |
| contents | As the deployment of comprehensive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security measures is still in progress, BGP monitoring continues to play a critical role in protecting the Internet from routing attacks. Fundamentally, monitoring involves observing BGP feeds to detect suspicious announcements and taking defensive action. However, BGP monitoring relies on seeing the malicious BGP announcement in the first place! In this paper, we develop a novel attack that can hide itself from all state-of-the-art BGP monitoring systems we tested while affecting the entire Internet. The attack involves launching a sub-prefix hijack with the RFC-specified NO_EXPORT community attached to prevent networks with the malicious route installed from sending the route to BGP monitoring systems. We study the viability of this attack at four tier-1 networks and find all networks we studied were vulnerable to the attack. Finally, we propose a mitigation that significantly improves the robustness of the BGP monitoring ecosystem. Our paper aims to raise awareness of this issue and offer guidance to providers to protect against such attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_09622 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Global BGP Attacks that Evade Route Monitoring Birge-Lee, Henry Apostolaki, Maria Rexford, Jennifer Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture As the deployment of comprehensive Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) security measures is still in progress, BGP monitoring continues to play a critical role in protecting the Internet from routing attacks. Fundamentally, monitoring involves observing BGP feeds to detect suspicious announcements and taking defensive action. However, BGP monitoring relies on seeing the malicious BGP announcement in the first place! In this paper, we develop a novel attack that can hide itself from all state-of-the-art BGP monitoring systems we tested while affecting the entire Internet. The attack involves launching a sub-prefix hijack with the RFC-specified NO_EXPORT community attached to prevent networks with the malicious route installed from sending the route to BGP monitoring systems. We study the viability of this attack at four tier-1 networks and find all networks we studied were vulnerable to the attack. Finally, we propose a mitigation that significantly improves the robustness of the BGP monitoring ecosystem. Our paper aims to raise awareness of this issue and offer guidance to providers to protect against such attacks. |
| title | Global BGP Attacks that Evade Route Monitoring |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.09622 |