Accelerating the Surrogate Retraining for Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914917728124928 |
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| author | Wu, Yunfan Cao, Qi Tao, Shuchang Zhang, Kaike Sun, Fei Shen, Huawei |
| author_facet | Wu, Yunfan Cao, Qi Tao, Shuchang Zhang, Kaike Sun, Fei Shen, Huawei |
| contents | Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of recommender systems to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject carefully crafted fake user interactions into the training data of recommenders to promote target items. Current attack methods involve iteratively retraining a surrogate recommender on the poisoned data with the latest fake users to optimize the attack. However, this repetitive retraining is highly time-consuming, hindering the efficient assessment and optimization of fake users. To mitigate this computational bottleneck and develop a more effective attack in an affordable time, we analyze the retraining process and find that a change in the representation of one user/item will cause a cascading effect through the user-item interaction graph. Under theoretical guidance, we introduce \emph{Gradient Passing} (GP), a novel technique that explicitly passes gradients between interacted user-item pairs during backpropagation, thereby approximating the cascading effect and accelerating retraining. With just a single update, GP can achieve effects comparable to multiple original training iterations. Under the same number of retraining epochs, GP enables a closer approximation of the surrogate recommender to the victim. This more accurate approximation provides better guidance for optimizing fake users, ultimately leading to enhanced data poisoning attacks. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed GP. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_10666 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Accelerating the Surrogate Retraining for Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems Wu, Yunfan Cao, Qi Tao, Shuchang Zhang, Kaike Sun, Fei Shen, Huawei Information Retrieval Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of recommender systems to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject carefully crafted fake user interactions into the training data of recommenders to promote target items. Current attack methods involve iteratively retraining a surrogate recommender on the poisoned data with the latest fake users to optimize the attack. However, this repetitive retraining is highly time-consuming, hindering the efficient assessment and optimization of fake users. To mitigate this computational bottleneck and develop a more effective attack in an affordable time, we analyze the retraining process and find that a change in the representation of one user/item will cause a cascading effect through the user-item interaction graph. Under theoretical guidance, we introduce \emph{Gradient Passing} (GP), a novel technique that explicitly passes gradients between interacted user-item pairs during backpropagation, thereby approximating the cascading effect and accelerating retraining. With just a single update, GP can achieve effects comparable to multiple original training iterations. Under the same number of retraining epochs, GP enables a closer approximation of the surrogate recommender to the victim. This more accurate approximation provides better guidance for optimizing fake users, ultimately leading to enhanced data poisoning attacks. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed GP. |
| title | Accelerating the Surrogate Retraining for Poisoning Attacks against Recommender Systems |
| topic | Information Retrieval |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.10666 |