Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866913475749478400 |
|---|---|
| author | Bilò, Vittorio Fanelli, Angelo Gourvès, Laurent Tsoufis, Christos Vinci, Cosimo |
| author_facet | Bilò, Vittorio Fanelli, Angelo Gourvès, Laurent Tsoufis, Christos Vinci, Cosimo |
| contents | Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the local minima of a potential function. We explore the problem of computing a state of minimum potential in this setting. Using the maximum number of resources that a player can use at a time, and the possible symmetry in the players' strategy spaces, we settle the complexity of the problem for instances having monotone (i.e., either non-decreasing or non-increasing) latency functions on their resources. The picture, delineating polynomial and NP-hard cases, is complemented with tight approximation algorithms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_11489 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games Bilò, Vittorio Fanelli, Angelo Gourvès, Laurent Tsoufis, Christos Vinci, Cosimo Computer Science and Game Theory Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the local minima of a potential function. We explore the problem of computing a state of minimum potential in this setting. Using the maximum number of resources that a player can use at a time, and the possible symmetry in the players' strategy spaces, we settle the complexity of the problem for instances having monotone (i.e., either non-decreasing or non-increasing) latency functions on their resources. The picture, delineating polynomial and NP-hard cases, is complemented with tight approximation algorithms. |
| title | Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.11489 |