Rank-Guaranteed Auctions
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910573378142208 |
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| author | He, Wei Li, Jiangtao Zhong, Weijie |
| author_facet | He, Wei Li, Jiangtao Zhong, Weijie |
| contents | We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rank-guaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M|+ 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and approximately optimal menus in various settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_12001 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Rank-Guaranteed Auctions He, Wei Li, Jiangtao Zhong, Weijie Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is rank-guaranteed, meaning that for any menu M and any valuation profile, the ex-post revenue is guaranteed to be at least as high as the highest revenue achievable from feasible allocations, taking the (|M|+ 1)th-highest valuation for each bundle as the price. Our analysis highlights a crucial aspect of combinatorial auction design, namely, the design of menus. We provide simple and approximately optimal menus in various settings. |
| title | Rank-Guaranteed Auctions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12001 |