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Fair Combinatorial Auction for Blockchain Trade Intents: Being Fair without Knowing What is Fair

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Canidio, Andrea, Henneke, Felix
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Theoretical Economics Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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