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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12347 |
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| _version_ | 1866909753983107072 |
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| author | Rubin, Mark |
| author_facet | Rubin, Mark |
| contents | One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration may facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo's error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper's theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a test procedure that is preregistered but that also allows deviations in its implementation (i.e., "a plan, not a prison") does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure's Type I error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity (a) in Popper's philosophy of science or (b) in Mayo's approach when deviations are allowed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_12347 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper's philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed Rubin, Mark Methodology One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration may facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo's error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper's theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a test procedure that is preregistered but that also allows deviations in its implementation (i.e., "a plan, not a prison") does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure's Type I error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity (a) in Popper's philosophy of science or (b) in Mayo's approach when deviations are allowed. |
| title | Preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper's philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed |
| topic | Methodology |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12347 |