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Main Authors: Contet, Clément, Grandi, Umberto, Mengin, Jérôme
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12927
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author Contet, Clément
Grandi, Umberto
Mengin, Jérôme
author_facet Contet, Clément
Grandi, Umberto
Mengin, Jérôme
contents We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_12927
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
Contet, Clément
Grandi, Umberto
Mengin, Jérôme
Artificial Intelligence
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
title Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12927