GPT-4 Emulates Average-Human Emotional Cognition from a Third-Person Perspective

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Tak, Ala N., Gratch, Jonathan
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Tak, Ala N.
Gratch, Jonathan
author_facet Tak, Ala N.
Gratch, Jonathan
contents This paper extends recent investigations on the emotional reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Current research on LLMs has not directly evaluated the distinction between how LLMs predict the self-attribution of emotions and the perception of others' emotions. We first look at carefully crafted emotion-evoking stimuli, originally designed to find patterns of brain neural activity representing fine-grained inferred emotional attributions of others. We show that GPT-4 is especially accurate in reasoning about such stimuli. This suggests LLMs agree with humans' attributions of others' emotions in stereotypical scenarios remarkably more than self-attributions of emotions in idiosyncratic situations. To further explore this, our second study utilizes a dataset containing annotations from both the author and a third-person perspective. We find that GPT-4's interpretations align more closely with human judgments about the emotions of others than with self-assessments. Notably, conventional computational models of emotion primarily rely on self-reported ground truth as the gold standard. However, an average observer's standpoint, which LLMs appear to have adopted, might be more relevant for many downstream applications, at least in the absence of individual information and adequate safety considerations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_13718
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle GPT-4 Emulates Average-Human Emotional Cognition from a Third-Person Perspective
Tak, Ala N.
Gratch, Jonathan
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Human-Computer Interaction
This paper extends recent investigations on the emotional reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Current research on LLMs has not directly evaluated the distinction between how LLMs predict the self-attribution of emotions and the perception of others' emotions. We first look at carefully crafted emotion-evoking stimuli, originally designed to find patterns of brain neural activity representing fine-grained inferred emotional attributions of others. We show that GPT-4 is especially accurate in reasoning about such stimuli. This suggests LLMs agree with humans' attributions of others' emotions in stereotypical scenarios remarkably more than self-attributions of emotions in idiosyncratic situations. To further explore this, our second study utilizes a dataset containing annotations from both the author and a third-person perspective. We find that GPT-4's interpretations align more closely with human judgments about the emotions of others than with self-assessments. Notably, conventional computational models of emotion primarily rely on self-reported ground truth as the gold standard. However, an average observer's standpoint, which LLMs appear to have adopted, might be more relevant for many downstream applications, at least in the absence of individual information and adequate safety considerations.
title GPT-4 Emulates Average-Human Emotional Cognition from a Third-Person Perspective
topic Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Human-Computer Interaction
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.13718