ARINC 429 Cyber-vulnerabilities and Voltage Data in a Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulator
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866914929390387200 |
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| author | Trask, Connor Movit, Steve Clutter, Justace Clark, Rosene Herrera, Mark Tran, Kelly |
| author_facet | Trask, Connor Movit, Steve Clutter, Justace Clark, Rosene Herrera, Mark Tran, Kelly |
| contents | ARINC 429 is a ubiquitous data bus for civil avionics, enabling reliable communication between devices from disparate manufacturers. However, ARINC 429 lacks any form of encryption or authentication, making it an inherently insecure communication protocol and rendering any connected avionics vulnerable to a range of attacks. We constructed a hardware-in-the-loop simulator with ARINC 429 buses, explored these vulnerabilities, and identified their potential to deny, degrade, or disrupt aircraft capabilities. We performed a denial-of-service attack against a multi-function display via a compromised ARINC 429 bus using commercially available tools, which succeeded in disabling important navigational aids. This proven attack on physical avionics illustrates the risk inherent in ARINC 429 and the need for the ability to detect these attacks. One potential mitigation is an intrusion detection system (IDS) trained on data collected from the electrical properties of the physical bus. Although previous research has demonstrated the feasibility of an IDS on an ARINC 429 bus, no IDS has been trained on data generated by avionics hardware. To facilitate this, we recorded voltage traces and message history generated by avionics and adversarial devices on the ARINC 429 bus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available collection of hardware-generated ARINC 429 signal data. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_16714 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | ARINC 429 Cyber-vulnerabilities and Voltage Data in a Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulator Trask, Connor Movit, Steve Clutter, Justace Clark, Rosene Herrera, Mark Tran, Kelly Cryptography and Security ARINC 429 is a ubiquitous data bus for civil avionics, enabling reliable communication between devices from disparate manufacturers. However, ARINC 429 lacks any form of encryption or authentication, making it an inherently insecure communication protocol and rendering any connected avionics vulnerable to a range of attacks. We constructed a hardware-in-the-loop simulator with ARINC 429 buses, explored these vulnerabilities, and identified their potential to deny, degrade, or disrupt aircraft capabilities. We performed a denial-of-service attack against a multi-function display via a compromised ARINC 429 bus using commercially available tools, which succeeded in disabling important navigational aids. This proven attack on physical avionics illustrates the risk inherent in ARINC 429 and the need for the ability to detect these attacks. One potential mitigation is an intrusion detection system (IDS) trained on data collected from the electrical properties of the physical bus. Although previous research has demonstrated the feasibility of an IDS on an ARINC 429 bus, no IDS has been trained on data generated by avionics hardware. To facilitate this, we recorded voltage traces and message history generated by avionics and adversarial devices on the ARINC 429 bus. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available collection of hardware-generated ARINC 429 signal data. |
| title | ARINC 429 Cyber-vulnerabilities and Voltage Data in a Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulator |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16714 |