Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913486200635392 |
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| author | Jöhlinger, Friederike Semenenko, Henry Sibson, Philip Aktas, Djeylan Rarity, John Erven, Chris Joshi, Siddarth Faruque, Imad |
| author_facet | Jöhlinger, Friederike Semenenko, Henry Sibson, Philip Aktas, Djeylan Rarity, John Erven, Chris Joshi, Siddarth Faruque, Imad |
| contents | The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models assumed in the security proof is imperative. In this paper, we explore the Trojan horse attack (THA) using Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD integrated photonic chips and how to avoid some of the security vulnerabilities using only on-chip components. We show that a monitor photodiode paired appropriately with enough optical isolation, given the sensitivity of the photodiode, can detect high power sniffing attacks. We also show that the placement of amplitude modulators with respect to back reflecting components and their switching time can be used to thwart a THA. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2408_16835 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices Jöhlinger, Friederike Semenenko, Henry Sibson, Philip Aktas, Djeylan Rarity, John Erven, Chris Joshi, Siddarth Faruque, Imad Quantum Physics The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models assumed in the security proof is imperative. In this paper, we explore the Trojan horse attack (THA) using Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD integrated photonic chips and how to avoid some of the security vulnerabilities using only on-chip components. We show that a monitor photodiode paired appropriately with enough optical isolation, given the sensitivity of the photodiode, can detect high power sniffing attacks. We also show that the placement of amplitude modulators with respect to back reflecting components and their switching time can be used to thwart a THA. |
| title | Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16835 |