Satisficing Equilibrium
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866908990311497728 |
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| author | Pradelski, Bary S. R. Tarbush, Bassel |
| author_facet | Pradelski, Bary S. R. Tarbush, Bassel |
| contents | In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution concepts. We study its theoretical properties and show that it provides sharp predictions, exists in most games as well as in a broad new class of economic environments, admits standard epistemic and dynamic foundations, and is empirically falsifiable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_00832 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Satisficing Equilibrium Pradelski, Bary S. R. Tarbush, Bassel Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution concepts. We study its theoretical properties and show that it provides sharp predictions, exists in most games as well as in a broad new class of economic environments, admits standard epistemic and dynamic foundations, and is empirically falsifiable. |
| title | Satisficing Equilibrium |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.00832 |