The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting FPGAs
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910605086031872 |
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| author | Galli, Davide Guarisco, Adriano Fornaciari, William Matteucci, Matteo Zoni, Davide |
| author_facet | Galli, Davide Guarisco, Adriano Fornaciari, William Matteucci, Matteo Zoni, Davide |
| contents | To defeat side-channel attacks, many recent countermeasures work by enforcing random run-time variability to the target computing platform in terms of clock jitters, frequency and voltage scaling, and phase shift, also combining the contributions from different actuators to maximize the side-channel resistance of the target. However, the robustness of such solutions seems strongly influenced by several hyper-parameters for which an in-depth analysis is still missing. This work proposes a fine-grained dynamic voltage and frequency scaling actuator to investigate the effectiveness of recent desynchronization countermeasures with the goal of highlighting the link between the enforced run-time variability and the vulnerability to side-channel attacks of cryptographic implementations targeting FPGAs. The analysis of the results collected from real hardware allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the protection offered by run-time variability countermeasures against side-channel attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_01881 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting FPGAs Galli, Davide Guarisco, Adriano Fornaciari, William Matteucci, Matteo Zoni, Davide Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture To defeat side-channel attacks, many recent countermeasures work by enforcing random run-time variability to the target computing platform in terms of clock jitters, frequency and voltage scaling, and phase shift, also combining the contributions from different actuators to maximize the side-channel resistance of the target. However, the robustness of such solutions seems strongly influenced by several hyper-parameters for which an in-depth analysis is still missing. This work proposes a fine-grained dynamic voltage and frequency scaling actuator to investigate the effectiveness of recent desynchronization countermeasures with the goal of highlighting the link between the enforced run-time variability and the vulnerability to side-channel attacks of cryptographic implementations targeting FPGAs. The analysis of the results collected from real hardware allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the protection offered by run-time variability countermeasures against side-channel attacks. |
| title | The Impact of Run-Time Variability on Side-Channel Attacks Targeting FPGAs |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.01881 |