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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.01887 |
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| _version_ | 1866929484342493184 |
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| author | Lin, Ziyu Lin, Zhiwei Guo, Run Chen, Jianjun Zhang, Mingming Liu, Ximeng Yang, Tianhao Cao, Zhuoran Deng, Robert H. |
| author_facet | Lin, Ziyu Lin, Zhiwei Guo, Run Chen, Jianjun Zhang, Mingming Liu, Ximeng Yang, Tianhao Cao, Zhuoran Deng, Robert H. |
| contents | Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) offer a protection layer for enhancing the security of websites. However, a significant security flaw named Absence of Domain Verification (DVA) has become emerging recently. Although this threat is recognized, the current practices and security flaws of domain verification strategies in CDNs have not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we present DVAHunter, an automated system for detecting DVA vulnerabilities that can lead to domain abuse in CDNs. Our evaluation of 45 major CDN providers reveals the prevalence of DVA: most (39/45) providers do not perform any verification, and even those that do remain exploitable. Additionally, we used DVAHunter to conduct a large-scale measurement of 89M subdomains from Tranco's Top 1M sites hosted on the 45 CDNs under evaluation. Our focus was on two primary DVA exploitation scenarios: covert communication and domain hijacking. We identified over 332K subdomains vulnerable to domain abuse. This tool provides deeper insights into DVA exploitation and allows us to propose viable mitigation practices for CDN providers. To date, we have received vulnerability confirmations from 12 providers; 6 (e.g., Edgio, Kuocai) have implemented fixes, and 1 (ChinaNetCenter) are actively working on solutions based on our recommendations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_01887 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Detecting and Measuring Security Implications of Entangled Domain Verification in CDN Lin, Ziyu Lin, Zhiwei Guo, Run Chen, Jianjun Zhang, Mingming Liu, Ximeng Yang, Tianhao Cao, Zhuoran Deng, Robert H. Cryptography and Security Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) offer a protection layer for enhancing the security of websites. However, a significant security flaw named Absence of Domain Verification (DVA) has become emerging recently. Although this threat is recognized, the current practices and security flaws of domain verification strategies in CDNs have not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we present DVAHunter, an automated system for detecting DVA vulnerabilities that can lead to domain abuse in CDNs. Our evaluation of 45 major CDN providers reveals the prevalence of DVA: most (39/45) providers do not perform any verification, and even those that do remain exploitable. Additionally, we used DVAHunter to conduct a large-scale measurement of 89M subdomains from Tranco's Top 1M sites hosted on the 45 CDNs under evaluation. Our focus was on two primary DVA exploitation scenarios: covert communication and domain hijacking. We identified over 332K subdomains vulnerable to domain abuse. This tool provides deeper insights into DVA exploitation and allows us to propose viable mitigation practices for CDN providers. To date, we have received vulnerability confirmations from 12 providers; 6 (e.g., Edgio, Kuocai) have implemented fixes, and 1 (ChinaNetCenter) are actively working on solutions based on our recommendations. |
| title | Detecting and Measuring Security Implications of Entangled Domain Verification in CDN |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.01887 |