Uniform price auction with quantity constraints

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteur principal: Yoon, Kiho
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Yoon, Kiho
author_facet Yoon, Kiho
contents We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder's quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_04047
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
Yoon, Kiho
Theoretical Economics
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder's quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.
title Uniform price auction with quantity constraints
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04047