Unmasking Covert Intrusions: Detection of Fault-Masking Cyberattacks on Differential Protection Systems
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Saber, Ahmad Mohammad Youssef, Amr Svetinovic, Davor Zeineldin, Hatem El-Saadany, Ehab F. |
| author_facet | Saber, Ahmad Mohammad Youssef, Amr Svetinovic, Davor Zeineldin, Hatem El-Saadany, Ehab F. |
| contents | Line Current Differential Relays (LCDRs) are high-speed relays progressively used to protect critical transmission lines. However, LCDRs are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Fault-Masking Attacks (FMAs) are stealthy cyberattacks performed by manipulating the remote measurements of the targeted LCDR to disguise faults on the protected line. Hence, they remain undetected by this LCDR. In this paper, we propose a two-module framework to detect FMAs. The first module is a Mismatch Index (MI) developed from the protected transmission line's equivalent physical model. The MI is triggered only if there is a significant mismatch in the LCDR's local and remote measurements while the LCDR itself is untriggered, which indicates an FMA. After the MI is triggered, the second module, a neural network-based classifier, promptly confirms that the triggering event is a physical fault that lies on the line protected by the LCDR before declaring the occurrence of an FMA. The proposed framework is tested using the IEEE 39-bus benchmark system. Our simulation results confirm that the proposed framework can accurately detect FMAs on LCDRs and is not affected by normal system disturbances, variations, or measurement noise. Our experimental results using OPAL-RT's real-time simulator confirm the proposed solution's real-time performance capability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_04242 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Unmasking Covert Intrusions: Detection of Fault-Masking Cyberattacks on Differential Protection Systems Saber, Ahmad Mohammad Youssef, Amr Svetinovic, Davor Zeineldin, Hatem El-Saadany, Ehab F. Systems and Control Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Signal Processing Line Current Differential Relays (LCDRs) are high-speed relays progressively used to protect critical transmission lines. However, LCDRs are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Fault-Masking Attacks (FMAs) are stealthy cyberattacks performed by manipulating the remote measurements of the targeted LCDR to disguise faults on the protected line. Hence, they remain undetected by this LCDR. In this paper, we propose a two-module framework to detect FMAs. The first module is a Mismatch Index (MI) developed from the protected transmission line's equivalent physical model. The MI is triggered only if there is a significant mismatch in the LCDR's local and remote measurements while the LCDR itself is untriggered, which indicates an FMA. After the MI is triggered, the second module, a neural network-based classifier, promptly confirms that the triggering event is a physical fault that lies on the line protected by the LCDR before declaring the occurrence of an FMA. The proposed framework is tested using the IEEE 39-bus benchmark system. Our simulation results confirm that the proposed framework can accurately detect FMAs on LCDRs and is not affected by normal system disturbances, variations, or measurement noise. Our experimental results using OPAL-RT's real-time simulator confirm the proposed solution's real-time performance capability. |
| title | Unmasking Covert Intrusions: Detection of Fault-Masking Cyberattacks on Differential Protection Systems |
| topic | Systems and Control Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Signal Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04242 |