Deanonymizing Ethereum Validators: The P2P Network Has a Privacy Issue

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Heimbach, Lioba, Vonlanthen, Yann, Villacis, Juan, Kiffer, Lucianna, Wattenhofer, Roger
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Heimbach, Lioba
Vonlanthen, Yann
Villacis, Juan
Kiffer, Lucianna
Wattenhofer, Roger
author_facet Heimbach, Lioba
Vonlanthen, Yann
Villacis, Juan
Kiffer, Lucianna
Wattenhofer, Roger
contents Many blockchain networks aim to preserve the anonymity of validators in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, ensuring that no adversary can link a validator's identifier to the IP address of a peer due to associated privacy and security concerns. This work demonstrates that the Ethereum P2P network does not offer this anonymity. We present a methodology that enables any node in the network to identify validators hosted on connected peers and empirically verify the feasibility of our proposed method. Using data collected from four nodes over three days, we locate more than 15% of Ethereum validators in the P2P network. The insights gained from our deanonymization technique provide valuable information on the distribution of validators across peers, their geographic locations, and hosting organizations. We further discuss the implications and risks associated with the lack of anonymity in the P2P network and propose methods to help validators protect their privacy. The Ethereum Foundation has awarded us a bug bounty, acknowledging the impact of our results.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_04366
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Deanonymizing Ethereum Validators: The P2P Network Has a Privacy Issue
Heimbach, Lioba
Vonlanthen, Yann
Villacis, Juan
Kiffer, Lucianna
Wattenhofer, Roger
Cryptography and Security
Many blockchain networks aim to preserve the anonymity of validators in the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, ensuring that no adversary can link a validator's identifier to the IP address of a peer due to associated privacy and security concerns. This work demonstrates that the Ethereum P2P network does not offer this anonymity. We present a methodology that enables any node in the network to identify validators hosted on connected peers and empirically verify the feasibility of our proposed method. Using data collected from four nodes over three days, we locate more than 15% of Ethereum validators in the P2P network. The insights gained from our deanonymization technique provide valuable information on the distribution of validators across peers, their geographic locations, and hosting organizations. We further discuss the implications and risks associated with the lack of anonymity in the P2P network and propose methods to help validators protect their privacy. The Ethereum Foundation has awarded us a bug bounty, acknowledging the impact of our results.
title Deanonymizing Ethereum Validators: The P2P Network Has a Privacy Issue
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04366