Enhancing Quantum Security over Federated Learning via Post-Quantum Cryptography
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915133925621760 |
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| author | Li, Pingzhi Chen, Tianlong Liu, Junyu |
| author_facet | Li, Pingzhi Chen, Tianlong Liu, Junyu |
| contents | Federated learning (FL) has become one of the standard approaches for deploying machine learning models on edge devices, where private training data are distributed across clients, and a shared model is learned by aggregating locally computed updates from each client. While this paradigm enhances communication efficiency by only requiring updates at the end of each training epoch, the transmitted model updates remain vulnerable to malicious tampering, posing risks to the integrity of the global model. Although current digital signature algorithms can protect these communicated model updates, they fail to ensure quantum security in the era of large-scale quantum computing. Fortunately, various post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been developed to address this vulnerability, especially the three NIST-standardized algorithms - Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. In this work, we empirically investigate the impact of these three NIST-standardized PQC algorithms for digital signatures within the FL procedure, covering a wide range of models, tasks, and FL settings. Our results indicate that Dilithium stands out as the most efficient PQC algorithm for digital signature in federated learning. Additionally, we offer an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings and potential directions for future research. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_04637 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Enhancing Quantum Security over Federated Learning via Post-Quantum Cryptography Li, Pingzhi Chen, Tianlong Liu, Junyu Quantum Physics Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Federated learning (FL) has become one of the standard approaches for deploying machine learning models on edge devices, where private training data are distributed across clients, and a shared model is learned by aggregating locally computed updates from each client. While this paradigm enhances communication efficiency by only requiring updates at the end of each training epoch, the transmitted model updates remain vulnerable to malicious tampering, posing risks to the integrity of the global model. Although current digital signature algorithms can protect these communicated model updates, they fail to ensure quantum security in the era of large-scale quantum computing. Fortunately, various post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been developed to address this vulnerability, especially the three NIST-standardized algorithms - Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+. In this work, we empirically investigate the impact of these three NIST-standardized PQC algorithms for digital signatures within the FL procedure, covering a wide range of models, tasks, and FL settings. Our results indicate that Dilithium stands out as the most efficient PQC algorithm for digital signature in federated learning. Additionally, we offer an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings and potential directions for future research. |
| title | Enhancing Quantum Security over Federated Learning via Post-Quantum Cryptography |
| topic | Quantum Physics Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04637 |