Seeing Through the Mask: Rethinking Adversarial Examples for CAPTCHAs

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Jabary, Yahya, Plesner, Andreas, Kuzhagaliyev, Turlan, Wattenhofer, Roger
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Jabary, Yahya
Plesner, Andreas
Kuzhagaliyev, Turlan
Wattenhofer, Roger
author_facet Jabary, Yahya
Plesner, Andreas
Kuzhagaliyev, Turlan
Wattenhofer, Roger
contents Modern CAPTCHAs rely heavily on vision tasks that are supposedly hard for computers but easy for humans. However, advances in image recognition models pose a significant threat to such CAPTCHAs. These models can easily be fooled by generating some well-hidden "random" noise and adding it to the image, or hiding objects in the image. However, these methods are model-specific and thus can not aid CAPTCHAs in fooling all models. We show in this work that by allowing for more significant changes to the images while preserving the semantic information and keeping it solvable by humans, we can fool many state-of-the-art models. Specifically, we demonstrate that by adding masks of various intensities the Accuracy @ 1 (Acc@1) drops by more than 50%-points for all models, and supposedly robust models such as vision transformers see an Acc@1 drop of 80%-points. These masks can therefore effectively fool modern image classifiers, thus showing that machines have not caught up with humans -- yet.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_05558
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Seeing Through the Mask: Rethinking Adversarial Examples for CAPTCHAs
Jabary, Yahya
Plesner, Andreas
Kuzhagaliyev, Turlan
Wattenhofer, Roger
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
Modern CAPTCHAs rely heavily on vision tasks that are supposedly hard for computers but easy for humans. However, advances in image recognition models pose a significant threat to such CAPTCHAs. These models can easily be fooled by generating some well-hidden "random" noise and adding it to the image, or hiding objects in the image. However, these methods are model-specific and thus can not aid CAPTCHAs in fooling all models. We show in this work that by allowing for more significant changes to the images while preserving the semantic information and keeping it solvable by humans, we can fool many state-of-the-art models. Specifically, we demonstrate that by adding masks of various intensities the Accuracy @ 1 (Acc@1) drops by more than 50%-points for all models, and supposedly robust models such as vision transformers see an Acc@1 drop of 80%-points. These masks can therefore effectively fool modern image classifiers, thus showing that machines have not caught up with humans -- yet.
title Seeing Through the Mask: Rethinking Adversarial Examples for CAPTCHAs
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.05558