Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866911177016082432 |
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| author | Hartman, Eden Aumann, Yonatan Hassidim, Avinatan Segal-Halevi, Erel |
| author_facet | Hartman, Eden Aumann, Yonatan Hassidim, Avinatan Segal-Halevi, Erel |
| contents | Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest, etc. Utilitarianism is typically computationally easier to attain but is generally viewed as less fair. This paper presents a general reduction scheme that, given a utilitarian solver, produces a distribution over states (deterministic outcomes) that is leximin in expectation. Importantly, the scheme is robust in the sense that, given an approximate utilitarian solver, it produces a lottery that is approximately-leximin (in expectation) - with the same approximation factor. We apply our scheme to several social choice problems: stochastic allocations of indivisible goods, giveaway lotteries, and fair lotteries for participatory budgeting. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_10395 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization Hartman, Eden Aumann, Yonatan Hassidim, Avinatan Segal-Halevi, Erel Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Multiagent Systems Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest, etc. Utilitarianism is typically computationally easier to attain but is generally viewed as less fair. This paper presents a general reduction scheme that, given a utilitarian solver, produces a distribution over states (deterministic outcomes) that is leximin in expectation. Importantly, the scheme is robust in the sense that, given an approximate utilitarian solver, it produces a lottery that is approximately-leximin (in expectation) - with the same approximation factor. We apply our scheme to several social choice problems: stochastic allocations of indivisible goods, giveaway lotteries, and fair lotteries for participatory budgeting. |
| title | Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Data Structures and Algorithms Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.10395 |