HPC with Enhanced User Separation
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Prout, Andrew Reuther, Albert Houle, Michael Jones, Michael Michaleas, Peter Anderson, LaToya Arcand, William Bergeron, Bill Bestor, David Bonn, Alex Burrill, Daniel Byun, Chansup Gadepally, Vijay Hubbell, Matthew Jananthan, Hayden Luszczek, Piotr Milechin, Lauren Morales, Guillermo Mullen, Julie Rosa, Antonio Yee, Charles Kepner, Jeremy |
| author_facet | Prout, Andrew Reuther, Albert Houle, Michael Jones, Michael Michaleas, Peter Anderson, LaToya Arcand, William Bergeron, Bill Bestor, David Bonn, Alex Burrill, Daniel Byun, Chansup Gadepally, Vijay Hubbell, Matthew Jananthan, Hayden Luszczek, Piotr Milechin, Lauren Morales, Guillermo Mullen, Julie Rosa, Antonio Yee, Charles Kepner, Jeremy |
| contents | HPC systems used for research run a wide variety of software and workflows. This software is often written or modified by users to meet the needs of their research projects, and rarely is built with security in mind. In this paper we explore several of the key techniques that MIT Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center has deployed on its systems to manage the security implications of these workflows by providing enforced separation for processes, filesystem access, network traffic, and accelerators to make every user feel like they are running on a personal HPC. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_10770 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | HPC with Enhanced User Separation Prout, Andrew Reuther, Albert Houle, Michael Jones, Michael Michaleas, Peter Anderson, LaToya Arcand, William Bergeron, Bill Bestor, David Bonn, Alex Burrill, Daniel Byun, Chansup Gadepally, Vijay Hubbell, Matthew Jananthan, Hayden Luszczek, Piotr Milechin, Lauren Morales, Guillermo Mullen, Julie Rosa, Antonio Yee, Charles Kepner, Jeremy Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing HPC systems used for research run a wide variety of software and workflows. This software is often written or modified by users to meet the needs of their research projects, and rarely is built with security in mind. In this paper we explore several of the key techniques that MIT Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center has deployed on its systems to manage the security implications of these workflows by providing enforced separation for processes, filesystem access, network traffic, and accelerators to make every user feel like they are running on a personal HPC. |
| title | HPC with Enhanced User Separation |
| topic | Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.10770 |