A knapsack for collective decision-making
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909320669560832 |
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| author | Ge, Yurun Böttcher, Lucas Chou, Tom D'Orsogna, Maria R. |
| author_facet | Ge, Yurun Böttcher, Lucas Chou, Tom D'Orsogna, Maria R. |
| contents | Collective decision-making is the process through which diverse stakeholders reach a joint decision. Within societal settings, one example is participatory budgeting, where constituents decide on the funding of public projects. How to most efficiently aggregate diverse stakeholder inputs on a portfolio of projects with uncertain long-term benefits remains an open question. We address this problem by studying collective decision-making through the integration of preference aggregation and knapsack allocation methods. Since different stakeholder groups may evaluate projects differently,we examine several aggregation methods that combine their diverse inputs. The aggregated evaluations are then used to fill a ``collective'' knapsack. Among the methods we consider are the arithmetic mean, Borda-type rankings, and delegation to experts. We find that the factors improving an aggregation method's ability to identify projects with the greatest expected long-term value include having many stakeholder groups, moderate variation in their expertise levels, and some degree of delegation or bias favoring groups better positioned to objectively assess the projects. We also discuss how evaluation errors and heterogeneous costs impact project selection. Our proposed aggregation methods are relevant not only in the context of funding public projects but also, more generally, for organizational decision-making under uncertainty. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_13236 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A knapsack for collective decision-making Ge, Yurun Böttcher, Lucas Chou, Tom D'Orsogna, Maria R. Theoretical Economics Collective decision-making is the process through which diverse stakeholders reach a joint decision. Within societal settings, one example is participatory budgeting, where constituents decide on the funding of public projects. How to most efficiently aggregate diverse stakeholder inputs on a portfolio of projects with uncertain long-term benefits remains an open question. We address this problem by studying collective decision-making through the integration of preference aggregation and knapsack allocation methods. Since different stakeholder groups may evaluate projects differently,we examine several aggregation methods that combine their diverse inputs. The aggregated evaluations are then used to fill a ``collective'' knapsack. Among the methods we consider are the arithmetic mean, Borda-type rankings, and delegation to experts. We find that the factors improving an aggregation method's ability to identify projects with the greatest expected long-term value include having many stakeholder groups, moderate variation in their expertise levels, and some degree of delegation or bias favoring groups better positioned to objectively assess the projects. We also discuss how evaluation errors and heterogeneous costs impact project selection. Our proposed aggregation methods are relevant not only in the context of funding public projects but also, more generally, for organizational decision-making under uncertainty. |
| title | A knapsack for collective decision-making |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.13236 |