Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866913510389186560 |
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| author | Culnane, Chris Conway, Andrew Teague, Vanessa Wilson-Brown, Ty |
| author_facet | Culnane, Chris Conway, Andrew Teague, Vanessa Wilson-Brown, Ty |
| contents | This report describes the implications for eVACS of two cryptographic errors in the Ada Web Services Library that it depends on. We identified these errors in the course of examining and testing the 2024 eVACS code, which was made publicly available in March 2024. We disclosed the problems to AdaCore, and explained the implications at the time to the relevant electoral authorities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_13570 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system Culnane, Chris Conway, Andrew Teague, Vanessa Wilson-Brown, Ty Cryptography and Security This report describes the implications for eVACS of two cryptographic errors in the Ada Web Services Library that it depends on. We identified these errors in the course of examining and testing the 2024 eVACS code, which was made publicly available in March 2024. We disclosed the problems to AdaCore, and explained the implications at the time to the relevant electoral authorities. |
| title | Security analysis of the Australian Capital Territory's eVACS 2020/2024 paperless direct recording electronic voting system |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.13570 |