Post-Match Error Mitigation for Deferred Acceptance

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Gale, Abraham, Marian, Amélie, Pennock, David M.
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Gale, Abraham
Marian, Amélie
Pennock, David M.
author_facet Gale, Abraham
Marian, Amélie
Pennock, David M.
contents Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants. Mitigating the effects of these errors is a different problem than the original match since the decision makers are often constrained by the offers they already sent out. We propose models for this new problem, along with mitigation strategies to go with these models. We explore three different error scenarios: resource reduction, additive errors, and subtractive errors. For each error type, we compute the expected number of students directly harmed, or helped, by the error, the number indirectly harmed or helped, and the number of students with justified envy due to the errors. Error mitigation strategies need to be selected based on the goals of the administrator, which include restoring stability, avoiding direct harm to any participant, and focusing the extra burden on the schools that made the error. We provide empirical simulations of the errors and the mitigation strategies.
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institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Post-Match Error Mitigation for Deferred Acceptance
Gale, Abraham
Marian, Amélie
Pennock, David M.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants. Mitigating the effects of these errors is a different problem than the original match since the decision makers are often constrained by the offers they already sent out. We propose models for this new problem, along with mitigation strategies to go with these models. We explore three different error scenarios: resource reduction, additive errors, and subtractive errors. For each error type, we compute the expected number of students directly harmed, or helped, by the error, the number indirectly harmed or helped, and the number of students with justified envy due to the errors. Error mitigation strategies need to be selected based on the goals of the administrator, which include restoring stability, avoiding direct harm to any participant, and focusing the extra burden on the schools that made the error. We provide empirical simulations of the errors and the mitigation strategies.
title Post-Match Error Mitigation for Deferred Acceptance
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.13604