RPKI: Not Perfect But Good Enough
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913512992800768 |
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| author | Schulmann, Haya Vogel, Niklas Waidner, Michael |
| author_facet | Schulmann, Haya Vogel, Niklas Waidner, Michael |
| contents | The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) protocol was standardized to add cryptographic security to Internet routing. With over 50% of Internet resources protected with RPKI today, the protocol already impacts significant parts of Internet traffic. In addition to its growing adoption, there is also increasing political interest in RPKI. The White House indicated in its Roadmap to Enhance Internet Routing Security, on 4 September 2024, that RPKI is a mature and readily available technology for securing inter-domain routing. The Roadmap attributes the main obstacles towards wide adoption of RPKI to a lack of understanding, lack of prioritization, and administrative barriers.
This work presents the first comprehensive study of the maturity of RPKI as a viable production-grade technology. We find that current RPKI implementations still lack production-grade resilience and are plagued by software vulnerabilities, inconsistent specifications, and operational challenges, raising significant security concerns. The deployments lack experience with full-fledged strict RPKI-validation in production environments and operate in fail-open test mode. We provide recommendations to improve RPKI resilience and guide stakeholders in securing their deployments against emerging threats.
The numerous issues we have discovered with the current RPKI specifications and implementations inevitably lead to the question: Is RPKI sufficiently stable to align with the expectations outlined in the White House roadmap? Certainly, it is not perfect, but is it good enough? The answer, as we will explore, varies depending on one's viewpoint. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2409_14518 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | RPKI: Not Perfect But Good Enough Schulmann, Haya Vogel, Niklas Waidner, Michael Cryptography and Security The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) protocol was standardized to add cryptographic security to Internet routing. With over 50% of Internet resources protected with RPKI today, the protocol already impacts significant parts of Internet traffic. In addition to its growing adoption, there is also increasing political interest in RPKI. The White House indicated in its Roadmap to Enhance Internet Routing Security, on 4 September 2024, that RPKI is a mature and readily available technology for securing inter-domain routing. The Roadmap attributes the main obstacles towards wide adoption of RPKI to a lack of understanding, lack of prioritization, and administrative barriers. This work presents the first comprehensive study of the maturity of RPKI as a viable production-grade technology. We find that current RPKI implementations still lack production-grade resilience and are plagued by software vulnerabilities, inconsistent specifications, and operational challenges, raising significant security concerns. The deployments lack experience with full-fledged strict RPKI-validation in production environments and operate in fail-open test mode. We provide recommendations to improve RPKI resilience and guide stakeholders in securing their deployments against emerging threats. The numerous issues we have discovered with the current RPKI specifications and implementations inevitably lead to the question: Is RPKI sufficiently stable to align with the expectations outlined in the White House roadmap? Certainly, it is not perfect, but is it good enough? The answer, as we will explore, varies depending on one's viewpoint. |
| title | RPKI: Not Perfect But Good Enough |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.14518 |